Can Africa Afford a Seat at the Table?

Developing country representatives often capture their demand for “voice” in the pithy saying that if one does not have a “seat at the table”, then one is very likely “on the menu”. In the developing regions of the world, especially in Africa, there is a justified dissatisfaction with how little say we get on global matters with direct impact on our wellbeing – from climate, to global trade and taxation. A demand for a voice, representation and the leverage to shape the policies which drive global outcomes undergirds the proliferation of international forums – G7, G20 plus one, BRICS and other such arrangements. Obtaining a voice comes at great cost, a crucial segment which remains missing from the conversation.

WHY WTHE DEMAND FOR “VOICE”

I have argued elsewhere that every system is comprised of rule makers and rule takers. Rulemaking confers inherent advantages, and every rule taker imagines the day they would become rule makers. If the system is incapable of accommodating their demand for a greater say – they may either actively seek to overthrow it or exit and create an alternative.

The basis of the demand from developing countries, is that the origins of the current global order are steeped in power imbalance from a bygone colonial era. They argue that this flawed origin imposes an unfair disadvantage on them within the global governance architecture. The goal of developing countries is to, at best, rewrite the rules or at worst, sit at the table when the rules are amended. Jake Sullivan references this when he calls China,  “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and the growing capacity to do it.” President Xi emphasized what he perceives as these unjust origins of Western advantages in his speech at FOCAC last week, telling the African heads of state gathered that  “…the Western approach to [modernization] has inflicted immense sufferings on developing countries. Since the end of World War II, Third World nations, represented by China and African countries, have achieved independence and development one after another, and have been endeavoring to redress the historical injustices of the modernization process.”

As the UN, the WTO and other global institutions are rendered ineffective by intentional, induced procedural dysfunction, we have seen a plethora of smaller arrangements, including BRICS as a means of obtaining a substantive say in global affairs. The necessity of representation or “voice” is the justification behind Africa’s demand for a seat at the G20 and two permanent seats on the UN security council. All legitimate demands.

A CRUCIAL MISSING ELEMENT: COST

What is missing from these conversations, at least in Africa, is the “cost of the seat at the table”. Those seats are not cheap and there is not yet a substantive  African conversation about how we would fund the seat. First there is the AU’s G20 seat and the basic cost of hosting a G20 summit – one of the means of driving the conversation about the issues one deems important. Hosting the G20 cost the Indian government $120 million dollars. The combined G8 and G20 summits in 2010 cost the Canadian government about CAD $1.1 billion. The 2018 G20 summit cost Argentina was $112 million. While these are one-time expenditures, they will be substantial for the African Union. This is especially because the AU “is currently not financed in a predictable, sustainable, equitable or accountable manner. It is heavily dependent on donor funding to run its programs and operations…” Some of these “donors” are other G20 members. Is the logic here for the AU to use the donations of G20 members to host G20 members at a summit? Today, it is not uncommon for African delegations to international meetings to have portions of their costs defrayed by either the host or another “development partner”. For people seeking voice, the irony of this arrangement seems lost on us that the cost of our seat at the proverbial table should be covered by the party to whom we are asserting autonomy.

The former Kenyan ambassador to the UN has an insightful Twitter post on how much of the UN costs is borne by the five permanent members of the United Nations. An African seat at the table will naturally come with the added responsibility of increasing contributions to UN  operations and those of other specialized agencies. Yet about half of the 73 countries eligible for debt suspension on the G20’s DSSI were African including Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal and Kenya. One or two these countries would almost certainly seek to occupy one of Africa’s permanent seats the UN, should we get one. We need to seriously consider the cost of that seat, since nothing impels discipline like accounting for costs. This accounting forces one  to consider the opportunity cost since every cent spent on that seat is a cent not available to spend elsewhere. What should a seat at the table deliver for Africa outside the psychic benefit of seeing an African in previously exclusive preserves of the West? There are currently Africans at the helm of the World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, and the International Labor Organization. Is this the version of a “seat at the table” we seek?

The argument here is not that Africa should not have a G20 seat or demand a permanent seat at the United Nations. The criticism is our failure to account for how we earn and maintain the seat. The problem is the cavalier nature of the discourse – the absence of a clear agenda on what the “seat” should deliver, deafening silence regarding how much this “seat” would cost, who would bear the cost and how it would be paid. The AU, which along with South Africa will represent African interests at the G20 still asserts that its Commission “does not have a strong oversight and accountability mechanism to ensure that resources are used effectively and prudently.” A G20 seat for the AU expands its responsibilities without an accompanying increase in its resources. Statecraft is expensive. How do we cover it?  

IT'S the ECONOMY, STUPID

It's hard to divorce leverage in global affairs from an underlying economic basis. If there is anything one can learn from China and its rise up the global power chart is how closely tied that rise is to its economic growth. In Africa, we can continue to seek and might even acquire a seat at the table, without an economic base. But that seat will be ceremonial, at best. In a material world, respect is only earned through wealth creation. There is therefore this singular scenario in which Africa covers its costs for global leadership. That scenario is one in which the African economy expands and Africa’s share of global trade rises from its current, paltry 3 percent.

The image above (taken from the Draghi Report on European competitiveness) explains how why so little of our needs, wants, and requests are honored regardless of how loudly and often we repeat them. The bigger one’s slice of the pie – the greater the voice.

To this end, the trend in Africa is not convincing, even over the circumstances completely within its control. The pace of the AfCFTA is disappointing, the pace and complexity of intra-Africa trade is disappointing. By creating and retaining value in Africa, we grow the heft of its collective market and consequently its voice. It just appears like our plan to reap a bountiful harvest without the backbreaking phase of plowing the field. There is only so much leverage one can obtain from wielding our 54 states, huge population and history to as a basis for a seat in global affairs. Africa’s path to a true reflection of its place in the world is economic.